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Before getting into some specific matters it might be well to con-
sider some basic propositions. First, State constitutions are not grants 
of power to the state legislative body, but are restrictions upon what 
would otherwise be plenary power. Also, a constitution is to be con-
strued as a whole, not item by item, and the whole is to be harmonized. 
There is a proper reluctance by the courts to decide a question on the 
basis of constitutional language or interpretation and a decision will 
not rest on a constitutional aspect if some other basis permits a resolu-
tion of the matter. There is a presumption of the constitutionality of 
statutes. A South Carolina case of 1812 reflected the views of the 
Chancellor and are appropriate at this point: 
It is the peculiar and characteristic excellence of the free govern-
ments of America, that the legislative power is not supreme; but 
that it is limited and controlled by written constitutions, to which 
the Judges, who are sworn to defend them, are authorized to give 
a transcendent operation over all laws that may be made in deroga-
tion of them. This judicial check affords a security here for civil 
liberty, which belongs to no other governments in the world; and 
if the Judges will everywhere faithfully exercise it, the liberties 
of the American nation may be rendered perpetual. But while I 
assert this power in the Court, and insist on the great value of it 
to the comm.unity, I am not insensitive of the high deference which 
is due to the legislative authority. It is supreme in all cases in 
which it is not restrained by the constitution ; and as it is the duty 
of the legislators as well as of the Judges to consult this and con-
form their acts to it, so it ought to be presumed that all their acts 
are conformable to it, unless the contrary is manifest. ( Chancellor 
Waties in Byrne's Adm'rs vs. Stewart's Adm'rs. (1812) (SC) 8 
Des ans, 466) 
1. MAY A LAW FOR A SPECIFIC COUNTY BE ENACTED BY 
THE STATE LEGISLATURE? 
•state Representative, District Number 50, York County. 
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Article VIII is the Revised Article on local governme nt in the 
state constitution and Section 7 of t;hat article reads (in par t ) : "No 
laws for a specific county shall be enacted and no county shall be 
exempted from the general laws or laws applicable to the selected 
alternative form of government." 
In the case of Knight vs . Salisbury ( 262 SC 565, 206 SE 2d 875 
( 197 4) ) at question was the constitutionality of an act of the General 
Assembly authorizing the issuance of general obligation bon ds for a 
Recreation Disbict. Also in question was the constitutionality of an 
act of the General Assembly creating the Reareation Distric t. Both 
piece s of legislation were enacted subsequent to the date of ratifica tion 
of revised Article VIII. The recreation district lay entirely within but 
was only a part of Dorchester County. 
Plaintiff contended that the provision of Section 7, which declar es 
that there shall not be enacted '1aws for a specific county" did away 
with powers previously exercised by the General Assembly allowing it 
to create special pUTpose districts. 
The defendants countered with two arguments: first, that if Sec-
tion 7 be construed to take away the plenary power, it was inoperativ e 
until the General Assembly provided by General Law for the structure, 
organization, powers, etc., of counties. The second argument was th at 
the power of the General Assembly to carve out a district from the 
territory of the state for the accomplishment of some public purpos e 
and levy taxes th ereupon was inherent and not curtailed by the pro-
visions of new Article VIII. 
Section 6 of Article X includes the following statement: 
The General Assembly shall not have power to authorize any county 
or township to levy a tax or issue bonds for any purpose except 
for educational purposes, to build and !repair roads, buildings and 
bridges , to maintain and support prisoners, pay jurors , county 
officers, and for litigation , quarantine and court expenses and 
for ordina ry county purposes , to support paupers and pay past in-
debtedn ess . . . 
Section 34 of Article III prohibits the General Assembly from en-
actin g local or special laws relating to certain topics and further pro-
vides th at "In all other cases, where a general law can be made ap-
plicable, no special law shall be enacted." 
In the Knight case, a majority of the Court held both of these local 
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statutes unconstitutional. In answering defendants' first argument, one 
of the majority justices held that the provision prohibiting laws for a 
specific county was operative even absent legislative enactment provid-
ing by general law for the structure, organization, power, etc. of coun-
ties. This justice also held that it was clearly the intention of Section 7 
to put an end to legislatively created special purpose districts within 
a given county. 
The other two majority justices reached the same conclusion on 
the basis that revised Article VIII provided a vehicle for general law 
on the matter of public service within a limited area of a county and 
concluded that the two acts in question violated Article III. 
In Neel vs. Shealy ( 261 SC 266 199 SE 2d 542) the court had prior 
to the Knight case ruled that revised Article VIII operated prospectively. 
Plaintiff in this case sought a declaratory judgment that revised Ar-
ticle VIII precluded the Newberry County Council from issuing bonds 
for hospital purposes. Plaintiff further asked that the legislation creating 
the County Council be declared unconstitutional. Both the legislation 
relative to the Bond act and that creating County Council were passed 
prior to ratification of revised Article VIII. 
Plaintiff also contended that counties and other political subdi-
visions had reserved to them only those powers possessed by such political 
subdivisions "at the effective date of the constitution," the effective 
date being December 31, 1895. But the court held that revised Ar-
ticle VII speaks from March 7, 1973 - the date of its ratification . 
Therefore, the court reasoned that local or special legislation enacted 
prior to the date of ratification of revised Article VIII was constitutional. 
In a York County case decided at the Circuit Court level and not 
appealed , the court .ruled unconstitutional an act creating a County 
Council for York County. This legislation passed after the date of 
ratification of revised Article VIII and created an entirely new form 
of county government. The court stated that "(T)he Act contravenes 
two constitutional mandates: one being that no special legislation re-
garding county government be passed, and the other being that the 
General Assembly shall by general law provide for county government 
structure." 
In a Lexington County case (Moye vs. Caughman) filed July 16, 
1975, our state Supreme Court held constitutional a 197 4 act as modified 
during the 1975 Session of the General Assembly. The legislation, 
among other things, changed the method of electing boards of trustees 
of the school boards for Lexington County. Plaintiff contended that 
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the Act was in violation of Article VIII, Section 7. The court, however 
held that " ( t) he trial judge correctly reasoned that the Knight cas; 
was not applicable to school districts." The command of new Article XI 
Section 3, is that "The General Assembly shall provide for the mainte~ 
nance and support of a system of free public schools." The court took 
"judicial notice of the fact that many school districts throughout the 
state are part of two or three counties, and, accordingly it would be 
impossible for any one county to pass rules, a:egulations, or ordinances 
governing the school district." 
At this point it would appear that the conclusion to be reache d 
is that except for matters relating to some educational mattea:s, the 
General Assembly is not in a position to enact a law for a specific county. 
2. DO THE PROVISIONS IN THE HOME RULE ACT REQUIRIN G 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO PERFORM CERTAIN IMPLE-
MENTATION FUNCTIONS VIOLATE SECTION 7 OF NEW 
ARTICLE VIII? 
Section 14-3701 of the Home Rule Act provides that each county 
may conduct a referendum on the selection of form of government. The 
referendum may be called in one of three ways, including an act of 
the General Assembly. Also, a referendum may be called to determine 
whether members of the governing body of the county shall be elected 
from defined single member districts oc at large from the county. This 
referendum may also be called in one of three ways, including an act 
of the General Assembly. It then says "The General Assembly shall 
provide for the number of councilmen or commissioners. In the event 
that the members of the governing body are required to be elected from 
defined single member election districts , the General Assembly shall 
provide for the composition thereof." 
Section 14-3706 of the Act states that "Members of the governing 
body of the county shall be elected in the general election for terms of 
two years or four years as the General Assembly may determine for 
each county." 
Section 14-37~4 places a limitation on certain local appoin tive 
powers of a council until 1980, implying a continuation of appointments 
in some instances by legislative delegations. 
The question can be properly raised as to the constitutionality of 
such provisions; particularly in view of the language of Section 7 of 
revised Article VIII and other language in that article. 
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3. WHAT IS THE STATUS FROM A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW-
POINT OF THE FIFTH FORM OF COUNTY GOVERNMENT? 
Under the Board of Commissioners form, when that form is selected 
in a referendum, as under any voter selected council form, General As-
sembly involvement is necessary. The Board is charged with "The 
hearing of all budget requests and the submission of a proposed annual 
budget for the operation of the affairs of the county which shall be 
submitted to the General Assembly not later than March fifteenth for 
appropriate action." 
Assuming that the only "appropriate action" reasonably contem-
plated is enactment by the General Assembly of a Supply Bill for a 
particular county, Section 7 language must be considered. The court 
could make a distinction and hold that acts, although for only one 
county, are valid when they are a step toward implementation, but as 
invalid when the act was a county supply bill under the Board of 
Commissioners form. 
4. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF COUNTY POWERS UNDER THE 
FOUR COUNCIL FORMS? 
The limitation on the powers of a county set forth in Section 6 of 
Article X have not been expressly repealed. These provisions have 
heretofore restricted counties to those matters considered "ordinary 
county purposes" as of 1895. A revision of Article X would directly 
remove the limitation on the powers and a revised article will likely 
be submitted to the voters in the General Election of 1976. 
In the Knight case, language was used indicating that the ordinary 
county purpose doctrine of Article X gave way and was repealed by 
implication on passage of revised Article VIII, but the two dissenting 
justices took the opposite view and held that Section 6 of Article X 
was not repealed by implication. 
5. MAY ANY COUNTY WITH A COUNTY COUNCIL FORM OF 
GOVERNMENT THEREAFTER ENGAGE IN SLUM CLEAR-
ANCE AND DISPOSE OF PROPERTY ACQUIRED FOR PUBLIC 
OR PRIVATE USES? 
The Home Rule Act states the powers of each county government 
under Section 14-3703. Each county government, except that under the 
Board of Commissioners form, within the authority granted by the 
Constitution and general law of the state shall have among other 
powers, the power 
to undertake and carry out slum clearance and redevelopment work 
in areas which are predominantly slum or blighted, the preparation 
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of such areas for reuse and the sale or other disposition of such 
areas to private enterprise for private uses or to public bodies for 
public uses and to that end the General Assembly delegates to any 
county the right to exercise the power of eminent domain as to 
any property essential to the plan of slum clearance and rede-
velopment. 
The key to the issue is the phrase in the general language of 
Section 14-3703 preceding the listing of powers. The phrase is "within 
the authority granted by the constitution. " Yet the broad language 
authorizing county governments to carry out slum clearance, including 
the power of eminent domain , and to make disposition of such property, 
is highly restricted and not available in many areas of the state. 
6. DO THE PROVISIONS IN THE MUNICIPAL SECTION RELAT-
ING TO MUNICIPAL COURTS VIOLATE THE REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR ALL COURTS TO BE A PART OF A UNIFIED 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM? 
Section 47-52 provides that the city council may elect or app oint 
a judge or judges of the municipal court. Section 47-38 relates to the 
duty and authority of a mayor or municipal judge or judges. 
Section 1 of Article V of the constitution provides that ''The Judicial 
power shall be vested in a unified judicial system, which shall include 
a Supreme Court , a circuit court , and such other courts of uniform 
jurisdiction as may be provided for by the general law." Section 22 
provides that "notwithstanding the provisions of this article, any existing 
comt may be continued as authorized by law until this article is imple-
mented pursuant to such schedule as may hereafter be adopted." 
In an opinion ( State ex rel Daniel R. McLeod , Attorney General 
v. The Civil and Criminal Court of Horry County) filed July 9, 1975, 
the Supreme Court held that the Associate Judge 's position had been 
unconstitutionally created in violation of Sections 1 and 22 of Article V. 
The court, which has exercised initiative in bringing into focus the 
constitutional mandate for a unified judicial system, would furthe r 
traumatically emphasize the need for the constitutional mandate to be 
legislatively fulfilled should it ever have to determine that the municipal 
courts were unconstitutional and lacked jurisdiction. 
Sound arguments could be advanced against such a conclusion 
being reached and if the question were ever presented, such argumen ts 
would likely prevail. The question hopefully will soon be made moot 
by legislative action on court reform. 
